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ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING IN GREAT 
BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
I. INTRODUOTION 
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the legal and 
legislative responses of Great Britain and the United States 
in the criminal area to a newly developed technology of elec-
tronic eavesdropping. Historic attitudes regarding the admis-
sibility of illegally obtained evidence at trial are used to study 
the systemic reaction to a novel means of evidence gathering 
which at first blush does not appear susceptible to satisfactory 
regulation within the traditional legal norms. The degree to 
which l~gal doctrine was adjusted and the source of the im-
petus for such change reHect the basic cultural d.ifferences of 
the two countries. Attitudes as to the proper role of police 
in society, the functions of judge and lawmaker and finally the 
amount of privacy an individual should rightfully expect are 
all expressed in the tempering of the legal doctrine to continue 
serving the same social purpose. While in both systems these 
basic concepts remained the same throughout, the particular 
conception did not change in Great Britain, whereas the con-
ception did indeed change in the United States and now more 
closely resembles the British.1 
The development of electronic eavesdropping techniques pre-
sented both the United States and Great Britain with a com-
mon social problem: technologically facilitated invasion of pri-
1 For the distinction between conception and concept drawn by Ronald Dworkin, 
8ee, The Jurisprudence of Mr. Nuon, N.Y. REV. BKS. 4 May, 1972. 
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vacy. Minute microphones can be contained in a coat button. 
Laser beams can pick sound waves off the outside of a window 
pane. Parabolic microphones can isolate a single conversation 
in a roaring crowd.2 How should the legal system respond to 
a technology which allows ever increasing intrusion into the 
lives of citizens T 
The law would be required to balance two competing inter-
ests. The first of these concerns is the right of citizens to be 
free of unreasonable snooping by the state. The second is the 
right of the state to be able to use the best means to obtain 
the best evidence of a crime and to be able to use such evidence 
to convict. Lord Cooper recognized this tension in Lawrie 1). 
Muir: 
. . . the law must strive to reconcile two highly important 
interests which are liable to come into conHict- (a) the 
interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregu-
lar invasions of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the 
interest of the State to secure that evidence bearing upon 
the commission of crime and necessary to enable justice 
to be done shall not be withheld from courts of law on any 
merely formed or technical ground. Neither of these objects 
can be insisted upon to the uttermost. 
In a more recent dissenting opinion· Mr. Justice Harlan saw 
the problem thus: 
Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well 
as mirror and reHect, we should not, as judges, merely recite 
the expectations and risks [of citizens] without examining 
the desirability of saddling them upon society. The critical 
question, therefore, is whether under our system of govern-
ment, as reHected in the Constitution, we should impose on 
our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer ... 
2See: Miller, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY (1971); Westin, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 
(1967); Amsterdam, Perspectiv,es on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349 (1974); Oakes, Studying the Ea:cZusioMry Rule In Search and Seizure, 37 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 665 (1970). For a brief survey of the exclusionary rule under Ca· 
nadian, English, French, German, Israeli, Japanese and Norwegian law see, The 
Ea:cluaionary Rule Regarding Illegally Seized Evidence: An International Sym· 
posium, 52 J. CRlM. L. CRIM'y & POL. SCI. 245 (1961). See also, Baade, Illegally 
Obtained Evidence in Criminal and Civil Cases: A Comparative Study of Classic 
Mismatch, 51 TEX. L. REV. 1325 (1973). 
81950 S.C. (J) 19 • 
• United Statesv. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
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II. EVIDENOE DOOTRINE 
To examine comparative treatment of electronic eavesdrop-
ping it is best, as a conceptual matter, to begin with a brief 
study of the general criteria for the admissibility of evidence 
in criminal trials. 
A. Great Britain: Relevance 
From an early time it was established in England that the 
test to be applied in considering whether evidence is admissible 
is simply whether it is relevant to the matters in controversy 
before the court. The court in Reg. v. LeathamlS in 1861 ad-
mitted certain evidence observing that, "It matters not how 
you get it; if you steal it even, it would be admissible." This 
same principle applied to evidence in civil cases.s 
B. United States: Federal/State Dichotomy 
In the United States there was no single test for the admis-
sibility of evidence as for many years a dichotomy existed 
between federal and state courts in this matter. 
In federal forums evidence obtained in violation of federal 
constitutional rights was held to be inadmissible because of 
. the violation. In 1877, the Supreme Court in E$ Parte Jackson" 
held that a sealed mailed letter is protected by the Bill of 
Rights. Nine years later, in Boyd v. United States,S the Court 
held that the Fifth Amendment forbade the use of "compelled" 
testimony. In 1914 the Court finally ruled in Weeks v. United 
States9 that O/II,y evidence obtained by federal officers in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in the federal 
courts. 
This exclusion applied only to the federal courts. In the 
state courts state rules governed the admissibility of illegally 
obtained evidence. The Supreme Court specifically rejected 
IS (1861) 8 CO][ C.C. 498,501. 
S LZoyd 11. M08tyn (842) 10 M&W 478. 
7 96 u.s. 727, (1877). 
8116 u.s. 616 (1886). 
9232 u.s. 383 (1914). 
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the notion that the Weeks exclusionary rule should apply to 
the states as well: Fourteenth Amendment due process did not 
require such a result.10 In 1949 Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote 
for the Court that as 
. . . most of the English-speaking world does not regard as 
vital to ... protection [against arbitrary intrusion by the 
police] the exclusion of evidence thus obtained, we must 
hesitate to treat this remedy as an essential ingredient of 
the right ... As· of [1949] thirty States reject the Weeks 
doctrine, seventeen States are in agreement with it ... [N]one 
[of the British jurisdictions] has held evidence obtained by 
illegal search and seizure inadmissible.ll 
Noting that states rely on other methods for assuring that the 
minimal requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment are met, the Court found no grounds for 
barring illegally obtained evidence in state court proceedings. 
Thus, the federal exclusionary rule announced in Weeks is 
treated by the Court a matter of judicial implication - not as 
a rule derived either from the explicit requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment or from legislation expressing congres-
sional policy. At the state level, where the great majority of 
criminal prosecutions were carried out, the Court felt that 
local public opinion was an effective check on the local con-
stabulary. Inasmuch as federal law enforcement officers were 
not subject to such controls, the exclusionary rule seemed a 
reasonable safeguarding device. 
III. ADJUSTMENTS OF DOCTRINE 
In both Great Britain and the United States there developed 
certain doctrinal adjustments to better balance the competing 
interests of individual liberties and state criminal law enforce-
ment. The conceptual starting point of the earlier cases ap-
parently yielded results in subsequent fact situations which 
appeared incompatible with notions of justice. In both systems 
the doctrinal tempering originated in the courts and repre-
10 WoZf v. CoZorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
11 ld. at 32. 
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sented a somewhat altered conception in order to meet the re-
quirements of new events. The basic doctrinal concept in both 
systems, however, remained unchanged throughout. 
A. Great Britain: Judicial Discretion 
English courts developed the doctrine of judicial discretion 
to exclude evidence which is admissible in law. The courts 
thus responded to the apparent harshness of the common law 
rule that whatever is relevant is admissible regardless of the 
method by which it was obtained. In small measure notions of 
fundamental fairness to the accused tempered the interest of 
the state in obtaining evidence of crime. While the concept 
underlying the evidence rules was still the same - relevance -
the particular conception of what is admissible might be altered 
in certain instances. 
Judicial discretion to exclude illegally obtained evidence 
based in part on the idea of fairness to the accused first ap-
peared in the Scottish courts.12 In the 1914 English case 
Christie the Earl of Hansbury protested against the sugges-
tion th~t a judge has the right to exclude evidence which is 
otherwise admissible in law.18 
Hansbury's objection was not honoured in later cases. For 
example, in Noor Mohamed v. The KingU in 1949 and H. M. 
Advocate v. Turnbu1l15 in 1951 where the defendants had been 
tricked into giving damaging evidence against themselves, the 
judicial discretion to exclude was acknowledged. The cases 
supporting the idea of judicial discretion are many. The fac-
tual situations wherein the issue is raised include the illegal 
obtaining of evidence, the breach of the Judges' Rules by po-
lice, as wen as cases where the accused was misled by author-
ities into providing them with evidence against himself.18 
12 Appropriately Croole 1). Duncan (1899) 1 Fraser (J) 50. 
13 [1914] 10 Crim. App. R. 141, 149. 
14 [1949] A.C. 182. 
15 [1951] S.C. (J) 96. 
16 The author deliberately excludes consideration of the use of forced con· 
fessions. Their prohibition from judicial proceedings was based as much on their 
notorious unreliability than on other more humanistic notions. 
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Nevertheless, while such discretion of the court is well estab-
lished, it is a device which does not lend itself to predictability: 
No cases have been found wherein the appellate court finds a . 
reversible error in the trial court's failure to exercise its dis-
cretion and exclude certain evidence. In practice then, the dis-
cretion appears to lie completely with the trial court. It is 
the trial court which decides the circumstances under which 
discretion ought be exercised. 
Thus in K'Ur'Uma 'V. The Q'UeenlT in 1955 the appeal from a 
death sentence for unlawful possession of two rounds of am-
munition on the grounds of unlawful search of a Kenyan was 
denied. Although the Board treats the search as having been 
unlawful and acknowledges that ". . . in a criminal case the 
judge always has a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict 
rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against an ac-
cused, " 18 they nevertheless find that the test of ". . . whether 
evidence is admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters 
in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court is not concerned 
with how the evidence was obtained." II 
More recently, in the curiously captioned case of King 'V. The 
Q'Ueen,1O an appellant's conviction for illegal possession of 
marijuana based on an illegal search was upheld. In this case, 
although the police deliberately violated the Jamaican consti-
tution's guarantee against warrantless searches, the Privy 
Council concluded that the discretion of the court was not taken 
11 [1955] A.C. 197. 
18 Id. at 204. 
II Id. at 203. Even reading this ease against the background of the Mau-Mau 
uprisings the foreign student is hard put to see when a judge .1aould exereiBe his 
discretion. This case seems precisely the sort in which a tempering efl'ect on the 
doctrine is needed. Here a native Kenyan faces execution. The only evidence 
against him was the testimony of two low-ranking native policemen, who were not 
empowered to search, and the ammunition they supposedly found. A pocket knife 
which the defendant allegedly had also been carrying was never produced. The 
defendant had been a man of good character. Defendant chose to travel along a 
road where he knew there was a police road block where he was likely to be searched; 
the defendant could have gone by another route where he knew that he wonld not 
be searched. Professor Franck lias criticized thia case strongly in 33 CAN. B. Rmv. 
721 (1955). 
20 (1969)1 A.C. 305. 
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away by the constitution and that furthermore, "This is not 
... a case in which evidence had been obtained by conduct of 
which the Crown ought not to take advantage." 21 
In Great Britain, then, the trial judge has broad discretion 
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence, where the introduc-
tion of such evidence would be somehow fundamentally unfair 
to the accused. Although in theory the trial court might be 
reversed on appeal for failing to exclude evidence, no cases in 
which this was done have been forthcoming. The strict test 
for admissibility of evidence is not whether the method by which 
it was obtained was tortious but excusable, but rather whether 
what was obtained is relevant to the issue being tried.22 
B. United States: Dissolving the Dichotomy 
Courts in the United States tempered the harsh results in 
individual cases arising from the federal-state dichotomy as 
well. Judicial adjustment of the Weeks doctrine was gradually 
effected until the principles of the exclusionary rule also ap-
plied to state proceedings. 
In the 1952 case of Rochin v. California2s the Supreme Court 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment did indeed require exclu-
sion from state court of illegally obtained evidence where po-
. lice activities so outrageously abused individual privacy as "to 
shock ... the conscience" of a "civilized society". Thus, there 
was created a narrow exception to Wolfe and a foreshadowing 
of subsequent decisions. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter had noted in Wolfe that the exclu-
sionary rule of Weeks was one of judicial implication and that 
states had other means of deterring unreasonable searches. In 
1961 in Mapp v. Ohio24 Mr. Justice Clarke, noting that the 
211d. at 319. 
22 Karuma at 204. 
23 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional 
Double Standm'ds: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L. J. 221 (1973), charac· 
terizes Rochin " ... when viewed in light of Wolf, as announcing a rule justified 
at least primarily by a principle." Id. at 271. 
24 367 U.S. 165 (1952). The Court later in Linkletter v. Walker 381 U.S. 618 
(1965) said its decision in Mapp was not based on the notion that the petitioner 
328 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & CoMPARATIVE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. I, No.1 
state remedies had proven ineffective against Fourth Amend-
ment violations, reversed Wolfe. The Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment fully incorporated the Fourth and that the 
exclusionary rule was an essential element of the guarantee. 
Although by then over half the states had adopted the exclu-
sionary rule, the Court said its action was the only effective 
means available to compel respect for the constitution. Ap-
parently, the states could no longer be trusted as the guardians 
of the federal guarantee. The Court closed the only remain-
ing courtroom doors which were open to receive evidence ob-
tained through official lawlessness. 
Thus, beginning with the concepts of due process and pri-
vacy found in the national constitution, the cases move from a 
federal-state dichotomy in the criteria for the admissibility of 
evidence, to the gradual broadening of the rule and, finally, to 
a dissolution of the dichotomy. It should be noted that the 
change occurs largely because the Court's perception of the 
underlying facts has changed: In Wolfe Justice Frankfurter 
acknowledges that the Fourth Amendment applies to the states 
by operation of the Fourteenth. He assumes, however, that the 
methods on which states rely to insure enforcement of the guar-
antees do not fall below the minimal standards assured by the 
Due Process Clause. Mr. Justice Clark in Mapp, noting that 
the factual grounds upon which Wolfe was based are invalid, 
had any right that the evidence not be used, rather Mapp was adopted as a deterrent 
to police activity of a given sort. 
See, Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1077·078 (1975), pointing to 
a distinction between civil eases, where it is assumed one of the pal-ties has a 
right to win and criminal eases, where the accused has a right to vindication if 
innocent but where there is no parallel right of the state if the accused is guilty. 
In a hard criminal ease, such as Mapp, the Court might properly find for thc 
accused purely on the basis of policy. Wellington, supra note 23 at 260, suggests 
that where the Court's decision is based on policy, inasmuch as the concern is with 
the subsequent behaviour of a class of persons, law enforcement officials, there 
is no reason why the ruling might not have been wholly prospective. 
The actual effect of the exclusionary rule has been the subject of much dispute. 
Bee e.g., Kamisar, PubZic Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and 
"Theories," J. CaUL. L. CalM 'y & POL. BCI. 171 (1962); LaFave, Improving 
Police Performance through the EitcZusionary BuZe, MICH. L. REV. 391, 566 (1965); 
Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free If the ConatabZe BZunders! 50 TEX. L. REV. 
736 (1972). 
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uses the change in the facts to extend the exclusionary rule to 
the states. 
Most recently, in Stone v. Powell,25 the Supreme Court has 
indicated that it is once again entrusting judicial enforcement 
of Fourth Amendment guarantees to state forums. The Court 
denied a state prisoner federal habeas corpus relief on the 
ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search 
and seizure was introduced because the state had provided an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation of the federal claim. 
The Court commented on the exclusionary rule: 
Application of the rule ... deflects the truthfinding process 
and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases 
between the error committed by the police officer and the 
windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the 
rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essen-
tial to the concept of justice.28 
Apparently the Court is moving back toward Justice Frank-
furter's conception of the requirements of the concepts of due 
process and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. 
Thus, although the basic concept of a constitutional guar-
antee remains the same, after M app the Court's conception 
of it is clearly different and after Stone it is different yet again. 
Likewise, in the English cases the basic notion of admissibility 
has remained the same whereas in any given case the concep-
tion of admissibility lies within the court's discretion. Finally, 
25 96 S. Ct. 3031 (1976). The Court noted that the "primary justification" of the 
exclusionary rule is deterrence of police conduct in violation of Fourth Amend· 
ment guarantees. Id. at 3048. The rule being one of judicial implication, just as 
it was adopted in response to a perceived need, so too when the judicial perception 
changes, the rule itself might be altered or abandoned altogether. But sce, Gerety, 
Bedefining Privacy, 12 Hllv. C.R.·C.L. L. REV. 233 (1977), suggesting a consti· 
tutional grounding for a substantive right of privacy. 
26 96 S. Ct. at 3050. Mr. Justice Brennan, State Constitutions and th.e Protection 
of Individual Bights, 90 Hllv. L. REV. 489 (1977), suggests that the trend of 
recent Court civil liberties decisions should prompt litigants to base their claims 
and judges their decisions on state rather than federal constitutional grounds. He 
notes that II. • • the centuries-old remedy of habeas corpus was so circumscribed 
last Term as to weaken d'rastically its ability to safeguard individuals from invalid 
imprisonment." ld. at 498 (footnote omitted). 
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it appears that the American courts are moving closer to the 
British conception. 
IV. ELECTRONIC EA.VESDROPPING AND EVIDENTIARY NORMS 
The conceptual framework of each legal system contains in-
herent problems; In the United States there appears an almost 
inevitable willingness to let the criminal go free because the 
constable had blundered. In Britain one can discern no guide-
lines as to when judicial discretion to exclude evidence should 
be exercised. Furthermore, given the willingness of courts to 
admit illegally obtained evidence, there even appears to be an 
incentive for police to resort to improper means. 
How were these problems resolved in light of the develop-
ment of wiretapping (telephone-tapping in British parlance) 
and other electronic eavesdropping devices! By whom were 
they resolved, the judiciary or the legislature! Could tradi-
tional evidence rules be applied successfully to a novel tech-
nology! 
A. United, States: Courts and Congress 
In Olmstead v. United, States2T the Supreme Court in 1928 
found that evidence obtained by the use of a police tap of a 
telephone was neither a search nor a seizure. Over the vigor-
ous dissent of Holmes and Brandeis the Court found no "tres-
pass" by the police in attaching the tap and no seizure of a 
"thing" as conversation was not considered a "thing". For 
Fourth Amendment purposes there was neither a "place" 
searched nor were "things" seized. 
Congress departed from the common law of evidence in the 
Federal Communications Act of 1934.28 Section 605 of the Act 
forbade any 
person not being authorized by the sender [to] intercept 
any communication and divulge or publish the existence. 
contents, Bubstance, purport, effect, or meaning of such in· 
tercepted communication to any person. 
27277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
28 47 U.S.C .• 151. 
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This section was held to apply to wiretapping by both state 
and federal officers, in cases involving both intrastate and in-
terstate communications.29 
Schwartz v. Texasso provided the wiretapping counterpart to 
Wolfe by ruling that wiretap evidence gathered by state officials 
was admissible in state prosecutions. 
The notions of trespass as in Olmstead were central to the 
Court's interpretation of Fourth Amendment rights in other 
bugging cases: In Goldman v. United StatesS1 placing a micro-
phone against the outer wall of a private office by federal 
agents was not deemed a trespass and, hence, not a violation 
of Fourth Amendment rights. Likewise in On Lee v. United 
States32 there was no trespass by fraud and hence no constitu-
tional violation where a wired-for-sound informant was used 
to transmit incriminating statements to a federal agent who 
related these at defendant's trial. 
Silverman v. United States8S adumbrates the new conception 
of the constitutional rights as announced in Mapp. Regardless 
of whether there was a technical trespass under local property 
law, listening to conversations by inserting a "spike mike" into 
a party wall and contacting a duct serving defendant's house 
was deemed an illegal search and seizure. For the first time 
the Court recognized the electronic seizure of conversation as 
within constitutional protection. 
Finally, in Katz v. United States" the Court specifically re-
jected the Olmstead and Goldman notions of trespass. Instead, 
the Court found the Fourth Amendment protection extends to 
persons - not simply areas - and as such the reach of the 
protection cannot be determined by the presence or absence of 
physical intrusion into some enclosure. 
29 Nardone v. United StateB, 302 U.S. 379 (1939); Benanti v. United StateB, 355 
U.S. 96 (1957); WeiaB v. United StateB, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). 
so 344 U.S. 199 (1952). 
31 316 U.S. 129 (1942). 
S2343 U.S. 747 (1952). See generaUll, Dix, Underoover InveBtigationa and PoZioe 
Bulemaking, 53 TEX. L. REV. 203 (1975). 
88365 U.S. 505 (1961) •. 
8f 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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Likewise, in Lee v. Florida,31l Schwartz went the way of Wolfe: 
Spurred by the federal policy protecting intercepted commu-
nications of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 and out-
raged at the lack of even a single prosecution of a law enforce-
ment officer under § 605, the Court held, as in Mapp, that noth-
ing will compel respect for the Act except removing the incen-
tive to disregard it by mandatory exclusion of the illegally 
intercepted communication. 
The Omnibus Crime Control Act of 196836 represents to a 
large extent legislative dissatisfaction with the judicial bal-
ancing of the competing interest~ noted above. Title III of the 
Act specifically amends the Federal Communications Act of 
1934 and serves to remove the judicially created means of pro-
tecting constitutional guarantees. It appears to authorize war-
rantless police searches and seizures in certain situations. 
Congress observes a necessity 
". . . to define on a uniform basis the circumstances and 
conditions under which the interception of wire and oral 
communication may be authorized, to prohibit unauthorized 
interception ... and the use of the contents thereof in evi-
dence ... " 37 
The Congress seeks to provide an indispensable aid to law 
enforcement agents in fighting "organized" crime, while safe-
guarding the privacy of innocent persons.8S The Act provides 
procedures for obtaining wiretap warrants from judges, as well 
as criminal and civil sanctions for unauthorized taps. Clearly 
the intent of Congress was to give law enforcement officials 
greater freedom in using electronic eavesdropping devices than 
recent Court decisions had indicated was within constitutional 
bounds. 
311392 U.S. 378 (1968). 
86 18 U.S.C. ~§ 2510-2520. See generally, Pulaski, Authorizing Wiretap Applica-
tions Under Title III: Another Dissent to Giordano and Chavez, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 
750 and Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of 
"Law and Order," 67 MICH. L. REV. (1969). 
87 ld., Title III § 801(b). 
38 ld., (c) (d). 
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Thus, interception of communication without prior judicial 
authorization is permitted for a period up to forty-eight hours 
in "emergency situations" involving conspiratorial activities 
characteristic of organized crime.89 In short, Congress has au-
thorized warrantless wiretaps for two-days. It shall be inter-
esting to see how this section will reconcile with the Katz deci-
sion. 
B. Great Britain: Courts and Parliament 
In Britain, as one might expect, evidence obtained by means 
of electronic eavesdropping is treated no differently than other 
evidence: The chief concern of the court in evaluating its ad-
missibility is relevance. 
In Hopes v. H. M. Advocate40 the Scottish court allowed into 
evidence a tape recording of a transmission from a wired-for-
sound blackmail victim. 
In R. v. Magsud Ali,41 involving the incriminating conversa-
tion of an accused murderer in a room bugged by police, the 
tape recording was held admissible provided the accuracy of the 
recordi1).g could be proved, the voices identified and that it is 
otherwise relevant. That court noted that defense counsel did 
not seem eager to argue the matter of whether such evidence 
. ought to be admitted. 
The court analogized electronically obtained evidence to pho-
tographs: 
. . . it does appear . . . wrong to deny to the law of evi-
dence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new 
devices . . . The criminal does llOt act according to Queens-
berry Ru1es. The method of the informer and the eaves-
dropper is commonly used in the detection of crime. The 
only difference here was that the mechanical device was the 
eavesdropper . .. The method of taking the recording can-
not affect admissibility as a matter of law although it must 
remain very much a matter for the discretion of the judge." 
(Emphasis added.) 
39 18 U.S.C. ~ 2518 (7). 
40 [1960] S.C. (J.) 104. 
41 [1965] 2 All E.R. 465. 
42 Id. at 469. 
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This particular formulation of the issue and the treatment of 
the legal problem has been followed in subsequent cases. 
Thus, in the most recent cases, the issue before the courts 
has been confined to a discussion of the originality of the tape 
recordings offered into evidence in R v. Robson, R. v. Harris,'8 
involving a charge of corruption, and R v. Stevenson, R v. 
Hulse and R v. Whitney/,' all charged with conspiring to ob-
struct the course of justice. 
Similarly, in Keeton v. R4r. the court allowed evidence of a 
telephone conversation incriminating the appellant. That court 
noted with approval that, "It must often happen that the po-
lice very properly use some form of subterfuge or deception 
in the detection and prevention of crime." 48 
Unlike the case of the United States Congress, the response 
by Parliament to both the notion of judicial discretion and to 
the specific application of the discretion generally as well as 
to the area of electronic eavesdropping has been quite favour-
able. 
Thus in the Younger Committee Report on the Right to Pri-
vacy,47 detailed recommendations are made to prohibit the pri-
vate use and manufacture of electronic surveillance equipment. 
However, the Committee sees no reason to exclude from evi-
dence in civil proceedings any such illegally obtained evidence. 
They approve the judge's discretion in both civil and criminal 
proceedings. " ... it is necessa.ry to take into account the 
desirability, for the sake of enabling the court to arrive at the 
right decision, that as much relevant evidence as possible 
should be admissible." 48 
Writing that same year the Criminal Law Revision Com-
mittee on Evidence/II having deliberated since 1964, specifically 
rejected the notion that illegally obtained evidence should be 
43 [1972] 2 All E.R. 699. 
44 [1971] 1 All E.R. 678. 
4r. [1970] Crim. App. R. 267. 
481d. at 271. 
47 YOUNGER COMMIT'l'EE REPORT ON THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY, CMD. No. 5012 (1972). 
481d. at 175. 
49 CRIMINAL LAw REvISION COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE, CMD. No. 4991 (1972). 
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inadmissible. The Committee also refused to define for the 
sake of uniformity the criteria on which judicial discretion 
should, be exercised because" ... it is best to leave it to the 
courts to lay down any general principles on which discretion 
should be exercised." 110 The Committee's Draft Billlll pro-
vided simply that nothing in the proposed act shall prejudice 
the power of any court to exclude evidence at its discretion. 
Parliament, apparently, is not only satisfied with the manner 
in which the courts are balancing the competing interests of 
individual liberties and state criminal law enforcement, but 
they deliberately will not inject themselves into the process 
except to lend support to the courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In summary, distinct attitudes toward personal rights and 
police practice have resulted in dissimilar doctrinal and insti-
tutional responses to the development of electronic spying tech-
niques. Evidence will seldom be excluded by a British court 
because of the manner in which it was obtained. While Parlia-
ment is' concerned with the abuses made possible by private 
use of electronic spying devices, it has left the courts free to 
exercise their discretion where official conduct is involved. The 
. United States Congress has provided procedures for official 
use of such devices, as well as criminal and civil penalties for 
unauthorized use. To the extent that under given circumstances 
Congress has allowed interception of communication without 
prior judicial authorization, the Congress has given law en-
forcement officers greater freedom in the use of such devices 
than the Supreme Court has found proper. 
Despite the two systems' oft-mentioned common cultural her-
itage, diversity in national wealth and power, social, ethnic 
and racial integration, and sheer size indicate the need for 
varied solutions. The context in which the problem is framed 
is itself unique and thus mandates a unique solution. But even 
110 lif. at 162. 
III ld. at 205, Part IV ~ 45 (8). 
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as the response has differed in both systems, it appears that 
the common social problem has compelled from each solutions 
which are markedly similar, perhaps reflecting - as one Brit-
ish lawyer put it - the risks of living toward the end of the 
twentieth century:12 
JOVI TENEV 
62 Supra note 47 at 161. The social effects of these risks remain to be seen. See, 
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1974): 
"Technological surveillance that transcends the limits of the human body is not 
merely more efficient than' human' investigation. The aspects of privacy that are 
part of the pattern of our lives depend on our knowledge of human limitations. 
There is no necessity that observation be limited by the capacities of the human 
eye and ear. Those limitations are contingent and can be extended by man's tech· 
nical virtuosity. Bnt if we do so, our attitudes and finally our behavior will be 
affected. It is a risky business to speculate how human beings will adapt to a 
changed environment . • . experience suggests that if we were to lose the cloak 
of anonymity in public places, we should be less open, more crafty, more secretive, 
and more isolated than we are now. There is no way to establish that· onr be-
havior is now better ... than it would be if we expected and had less privacy. In 
the end. we must rely on an unproved vision of men in society." 
